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EQUITABLE PROTECTION AGAINST WASTE AND
TRESPASS.
By

WjhmAiW

Q.

DE FUNrAK*

Waste may be described as a permanent injury to real
property committed by one having some title less than the
whole, in derogation of the rights of those having the Iemaning
interest. There must be privity of estate. If the injury is done
by a stranger, one not in privity of estate, then it is a trespass
as distinguished from waste.1 Waste may be further described
as permissive or voluntary Permissive waste is that arising
from neglect or omission of care while voluntary waste is that
which is active or wilful, as by commission of destructive acts.2
At the early common law there was provision for a writ of
waste whereby, in limited situations, recovery of damages could
be had for waste. The writ lay only against tenants of estates
created by law as distinguished from those which came into
being through act of the owner of realty 3 Subsequently, by
statute the class liable for waste was enlarged to include tenants for life and tenants for terms of years, and to include estates created by the owner, and by additional statute the punish* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. Author, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMUNITY PROPERTY.
'See MERWIN, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (1895), p. 428.
"Waste may be defined as injury to the inheritance by one
rightfully in possession, but having an estate less than a fee,-as, for
example, a tenant for life or years
Waste, because of its nature
(injury to the inheritance, permanent damage to the land), necessarily results, if permitted to occur, in irrreparable injury." Moreland, Insolvency as Basis of Equity Jurisdiction (1933) 22 KY. L. J. 1.
'MOORE, CYC. LAW DICT., 3d Ed., BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY
680 (10th ed.), TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY secs. 630, 640 (3d ed.).
'Camden Trust Co. v. Handle, 132 N. J. Eq. 97, 26 A. 2d 865, 154

A.L.R. 602 (1942)

]KENTUKY LAW JOURNAL

ment for waste was fixed at forfeiture of the thing or place
wasted and fortreble damages. 4 To the extent that waste is thus
recognized at law it is termed legal waste. However, tecbnncalities of the law prevented resort to the action in several instances.5
In such instances, where no remedy was available at law,
resort began to be had to equity for relief. Thus, we have the
situation developed where conduct was not recognized as waste
at law or at least was not recognized as giving rise to any cause
of action at law but was recognized by equity as a ground for
relief, because of the permanent injury threatened. We thus
have the development of the so-called equitable waste. In
addition, it seems to have become common in England for one
creating estates to place in the instrument creating the estate
the provision that the estate or interest was to be held without
being subject to "impeachment of waste," under which there
was no liability at law. Despite this provision, unconscionable
acts of destruction might still be grounds for relief, in the eyes
of equity, as being equitable waste. 6
It will be noticed that resort to equity is in any event much
more advisable since the prevention of the permanent injury is
naturally a more adequate remedy Although this reason for
resorting to equity seems to have developed at a later period, it
is now the primary reason for doing so. The result is that the
distinctions between legal waste and equitable waste now have
very little importance, since the great majority of proceedings
'Camden Trust Co. v Handle, supra, n. 3.
Several of our states have statutes providing for treble damages
and a few have provisions for double damages. See TIFFANY, REAL
-PROPERTY sec. 646 (3d ed.), RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY sec. 198, note.
"For purely technical reasons the remainderman or reversioner
in fee could not maintain this writ against the tenant in possession
if a second life estate intervened, and the second life tenant had no
remedy at law in such cases because the action of waste could be
brought only by the owner of the immediate estate of inheritance."
WALSH, TREATISE ON EQUITY 135 (1930).
"No person shall have an action of waste unless he hath the
immediate estate of inheritance." Co. LITT. 53, b.
--WALSH, op. cit. supra'note 5 at 142.
It has not been customary in the United States to include such a
provision. For an ,illustration, however, see Clement v. Wheeler, 25
N.H. 361 (1852).
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for relief are in equity 7 And equity applies its own standards
in determining whether equitable relief is warranted, whether
the waste be called legal or equitable. Moreover, it is the consequences, not so much the nature of injury, with which equity
is concerned. 8 From the standpoint of equity, among others,
waste may be committed by a tenant for life or for years as
against the reversioner or remainderman, 9 or by one joint tenant
or tenant in common against his co-tenant, 10 and generally by
one in possession of realty which is security for a right or claim
held by another. 1
"See BisPHAm, op. cit. supra note 1 at 679.

"The remedy by a bill in equity is, so much more easy, expeditious and complete, that it is almost invariably resorted to. By such
a bill not only may future waste be prevented, but, as we have
already seen, an account may be decreed and compensation given
for past waste." STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, sec. 917, quoted in
Poertner v Russell, 33 Wis. 193 (1873) Or, in view of the code
merger of law and equity in one court, in most states an injunction
plus damages for the waste so far committed may be obtained in the
same action.
"Chancery goes greater lengths than the courts of law in staying waste. It is a wholesome jurisdiction, to be liberally exercised in
the prevention of irreparable injury, and depends upon much latitude of discretion in the court." Kane v Vandenburgh, 1 Johns. Ch.
(N.Y.) 11 '(1814).
The solicitude of equity in cases of alleged waste and the reasons
therefor are discussed by LAWRENCE, EQuiTY JURISPRUDENCE (1939),
sec. 878. See also Biggs v. Bank of Marshfield, 90 Ind. App. 467, 169
N.E. 71 (1929).
""The weight of authority in the United States holds both classes
of tenant (liable)." CHAFEE, CASES ONq EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST
TORTS (1933)

16, note.

Tenant for one year enjoined, see Poertner v. Russell, 33 Wis. 193
(1873)
Tenant from year to year of tenant for life enjoined by latter,
see Kane v Vandenburgh, 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 11 (1814).
"While the Statute of Westmimster II provided for an action of
waste between co-tenants, it did not define waste. Since co-tenants
have equal rights in the use and enjoyment of the estate, to warrant
equitable relief the conduct of one would have to be malicious or
unconscionable enough to constitute waste in the eyes of equity, i.e.,
constitute equitable waste. See McCord v. Oakland, etc., Min. Co., 64
Cal. 134, 27 P 863, 49 Am. Rep. 686 (1883) that only equitable
waste may be restrained by co-tenant. Although some cases have
declared that the co-tenant can restrain legal waste, as in Williamson v. Jones, 43 W Va. 562, 27 S.E. "411, 38 L.R.A. 694, 64 Am. St. Rep.
1891 (1897), the test to determmevhat is legal waste will be found to
be exactly that used to determine equitable waste. See WALSH, op.

cit. supra note 5 at 146.
"Thus waste may be enjoinable by a mortgagee against Ins
mortgagor in possession, or for that matter by a mortgagor against
the mortgagee in possession, by a contract purchaser -against his

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

While the English statutes were early construed to include
permissive as well as voluntary waste, it seems now to be the
view in England that equity will not restrain permissive waste
necessarily involving mandatory orders to perform positive
acts.12 While the same view has sometimes been taken m the
American cases, on the ground that it is too difficult or not
practicable for the court to supervise the performance of the
14
positive acts, 13 the contrary view has frequently been taken,
and the modern cases generally can be expected to take the
present more liberal view of the ability of equity to supervise
performance of positive acts and to grant equitable relief against
permissive waste. 15
Originally the typical illustrations of -waste were permanent
injury to the estate by the cutting of timber or by removing
vendor in possession or by the vendor against the contract purchaser
in possession. Cases illustrative of these and other situations, see
CHAFEE, CASES ON EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST TORTS 29, 30, note
(1933). See also GLENN, MORTGAGES sec. 194 et seq. (1943), annotation, Right of mortgagee to maintain suit to stay waste, 48 A.L.R.
1156; annotation, Exploitation of oil or gas resources by mortgagor,
or purchaser or lessee subsequently to mortgage, as waste against
mortgagee, 95 A.L.R. 957.
" Camden Trust Co. v. Handle, supra note 3; Kirchwey, Liability
for Waste (1908) 8 -COL. L. REV. 425, 624.
' See Camden Trust Co. v Handle, supra note 3.
In TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY sec. 642, (3d ed.) it is declared that
"it has usually been decided" that courts of equity will not take
jurisdiction of a proceeding to restrain permissive waste. It is to be
noticed that several of the authorities cited are English and Canadian.
American authorities to the contrary are disregarded.
" Prevalence of American cases granting equitable relief, see
WALSH, op. cit. supra note 5 at 140, 141, Kirchwey Liability for
Waste (1908)

8 COL. L. REV. 624, 634.

S
in equity an injunction will be granted to restrain perrmssive as well as voluntary waste." Poertner v. Russell, supra note 7,
citing Story
In the case of voluntary waste, courts have not only enjoined
further acts of waste, but ordered restoration of what has already
been wasted or injured, thus definitely requiring a positive or affirmative act. The classic example of this is Vane v Lord Barnard,
2 Vern. '738, 23 Eng. Rep. 1082 (1716).
But see Camden Trust Co. v. Handle, supra note 3.
Failure of a life tenant to pay taxes, with possibility of a resulting tax sale, has been treated as perrmssive waste. See Thayer v.
Shorey, 287 Mass. 76, 191 N.E. 435, 94 A.L.R. 307 (1934), and annotation thereto. The expediency of extending the term waste to such
a default is subject to doubt, as remarked by TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY sec. 630 (3d ed.).
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stone, coal or ore, which it will be noted constitute acts of voluntary waste, 16 but waste, from the standpoint of equity, would
now extend to any injury which impairs or destroys the substance of the estate so as to cause permanent injury 17
Even acts which increase the value of the estate may technically be waste because they change the character of the estate.
This type of waste is called meliorating waste. Whether equity
should prevent the commission of this type of waste should
depend on what is ascertained to have been the intent of the one
creating the estates or interests or what was his reasonably presumed intent. Such intent or reasonably presumed intent should
control. Despite the fact that the value of the estate may be increased, it may have been the intent that it should be preserved

in its original condition.' 8 The reasonable wishes of those having
the remaining interests should also be given consideration by the
equity court. 19 Of course, consideration may be and is frequently given to the nature of the estate and the necessity of
20
adapting it to the uses for which it was created.
Trespass, as distinguished from waste, is some direct injury
to real property committed by a stranger, in other words by
one not in any privity of estate or title with the plaintiff. 21 By
" Notice that in the United states, particularly in the earlier
days of this country, a different view might be taken from that in
England as to a tenant cutting timber. The necessity of clearing the
land for purposes of habitation and agriculture might be involved,
necessitating cutting at least a reasonable amount of timber. See
BIsPHAm, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 680 (10th ed.) Note (1930) 15 CORN.
L. Q. 501, 503.
7 "Waste is an unreasonable or improper use, abuse, mismanagement or omission of duty touching real estate by one rightfully in
possession, which results in its substantial injury" Thayer v Shorey,
supra note 15.
"See TiFFANT, op. cit. supra sec. 630; Note (1930) 15 CoR. L.Q.
501.
" See Brokaw v. Fairchild, 135 Misc. 70, 237 N.Y.S. 6 (1929),
noted (1930), 15 CORN. L.Q. 501 (1930), 43 HARV. L. REV. 506, aff'd
237 App. Div. 704, 245 N.Y.S. 420 (1930), 256 N.Y. 670, 177 N.E. 186
(1931), (without opinion) RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY sec. 140.
"See J. H. Bellows v. Covell, 28 Ohio App. 277, 162 N.E. 621
(1927).
'See MERWIN, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 429, (1895).
At an early date it became established that the English courts
of chancery, although enjoining waste, did not enjoin trespass.
Eventually, it was recognized that trespass constituting a permanent
injury to the freehold, as in the case of waste, was logically grounds
for equitable relief, hence the origin of the term "trespass in the
nature of waste." As in the case of waste, equitable relief has been

260
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direct injury to real property is usually meant some injury
resulting from actual physical or tangible contact or invasion
on or below the surface of the property This physical invasion
may be by the defendant in person or by some force projected
by him. 22 Actual invasion above the surface, even if physically
touching some building or other improvement on the property,
while sometimes classed as a trespass, 23 is frequently distmguished by courts of equity from a trespass and classified as a
nuisance. 24 The trespass may be committed under no claim or
color of right, in which event it involves no dispute as to title,
or it may be committed under some claim or color of right or
title which is in conflict with or hostile to the plaintiff's claimed
ownership and thus involve an issue of fact at law as to title.
In the latter situation a difficulty is presented in non-code states
which is discussed subsequently
Equitable relief, by way of injunction, is warranted where
the remedy at law is inadequate. The remedy at law is considered inadequate where the injury being caused or which is
extended to any injury from trespass which impairs or destroys the
substance of the estate. See Kellogg v King, 114 Cal. 378, 46 Pac. 166,
55 Am. St. Rep. 54 (1896), McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQurrY 230
(1936)

WALSH, TREATISE ON EQUrrY sec 28 (1930).

blasting on neighboring property causes rocks or the
like to be hurled on plaintiff's land, there is certainly a sufficient
physical invasion to constitute trespass. See East v. Saks, 214 Ala.
58, 106 So. 185 (1925) Where the injury results from the shock or
concussion of the blasting, there would seem to be some conflict of
opinion, but it would seem more correct to term the situation a
nuisance.
Some disagreement exists as to whether allowing imponded
waters to escape or percolate to the plaintiff's property to his injury
or discharging water on his property is a nuisance or a trespass.
Classified as a nuisance, see Nelson v. Robinson, 47 Cal. App. 2d 520,
118 P 2d 350 (1941) as a trespass, see Rueckert v. Sicking, 20 Ohio
App. 162, 153 N.E. 129 (1923)
' Conflict of opinion as to whether this is an adverse user or a
dispossession, with reference to availability of legal action of eject'-Where

ment, see WALSH, Op. cit. supra note 21 at sec. 31.

Where airplanes are involved, as in low level flights over property of plaintiff, the act to the extent that it is wrongful is usually
termed a trespass and enjoinable as such. See Causby v. United
States, 60 F Supp. 751 (1945), noted (1945) 58 HARV. L. REV. 1252;
Burnham v Beverly Airways, Inc., 42 N.E. 2d 575 (Mass. 1942),
noted (1942) 22 B.U.L. REV. 625 (1943) 28 CORN. L. Q. 200.
" "The wrong here complained of was an encroachment, not
upon plaintiff's land, but upon the space above the land, and therefore was not a trespass but a nuisance." Kafka v. Bozio, 191 Cal. 746,
218 Pac. 753, 29 A.L.R. 833 (1923), citing WOOD, NuisANCEs, and
noted 33 YALE L. J. 557 (1924).
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threatened with reasonable probability will be substantial and
permanent or, to phrase it otherwise, will be irreparable. 25 The
situation is one in which no pecuniary recovery, no matter how
large, can repair the injury or restore the status quo.
In many jurisdictions, the ren edy at law is also inadequate
where the trespass is repeated or continuous, involving recourse
to multiplicity of actions at law for damages and thus resulting
in serious vexation, harrassment or oppression. 26 In jurisdictions
which specifically require that irreparable injury be alleged and
proved as threatened, as prerequisite to equitable relief, it would
not appear that mere necessity of recourses to a multiplicity of
actions at law for damages would constitute irreparable injury
These latter jurisdictions, however, quite frequently advance
the ground that the repeated or continuous acts of trespass
might give rise to an easement or adverse right or title in the
property which would constitute irreparable injury since it
27
would thereby reduce the substance of the plaintiff's estate.
And there is also the probability that the cumulative effect of
recurring acts of trespass will be permanent or irreparable
injury 28 It may also be noticed that repeated or continuous
acts of trespass may interfere with the plaintiff's reasonable
enjoyment and use of his property and thus in that way reduce
29
or destroy the substance of Ins estate.
Another ground for equitable relief advanced in the case
of trespass has been that damages are so speculative or con' In California, for example, it is specifically required that irreparable injury be alleged and proved, as prerequisite to equitable
relief. See Mechanics' Foundry v. Ryall, 75 Cal. 601, 17 Pac. 703

(1888).

'Baker v. Howard County Hunt, 188 Atl. 223 (Md. 1936)
Although the term "multiplicity of actions at law" originally

meant causes of action against a plurality of persons, the term now
is also applied to a succession of actions between the same parties,
in the case of repeated or continuing trespasses. See LAWRENCE,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE sec. 872 (1929).

"Umon Oil Co. v. Domengeaux, 30 Cal. A. 2d 266, 86 P 2d 127
(1939).
2'As where repeated trespasses to cut down timber will result in
converting timber land in waste and pasture land. See Shipley v
Ritter, 7 Md. 408, 61 Am. Dec. 371 (1855).
29Kellogg v. King, 114 Cal. 378, 46 Pac. 166, 55 Am. St. Rep. 54
(1896), Baker v. Howard County Hunt, 188 Atl. 223 (Md. 1936),
Ashinsky v Levenson, 256 Pa. 14, 100 Atl. 491, L.R.A. 1917D 994

(1917).
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jectural that compensation cannot be adequately measured or
determined in an action at law.30 However, this will usually be
found to exist in connection with other grounds, such as the
probability of permanent or irreparable injury or necessity of a
multiplicity of actions at law.3 1 Whether insolvency of the
defendant renders the remedy at law inadequate is a matter of
dispute. In some jurisdictions, insolvency alone is declared to
render the remedy at law inadequate and to warrant equitable
relief. In others, it is not in itself enough to render the remedy
at law inadequate, although insolvency is recognized as a factor
which may be considered with others in determimng the matter
of inadequacy 32
In the case of an occasional trespass, temporary in its
results, threatening no permanent or irreparable injury or not
vexatious or oppressive in nature, the plaintiff is left to ins
remedy at law. Indeed, resort to calling a policeman may be
sufficient in some cases.33 The equitable maxim may also
be kept in mind that "Equity does not stoop to pick up pins."
Where the plaintiff alleges trespass by the defendant and
the latter justifies himself under some claim of legal right or
title hostile to or in conflict with the plaintiff's legal right or
title, the plaintiff's legal right must first be established before
it can be determined whether he is entitled to equitable relief.
The determination of the legal right is not within the jurisdiction of equity So, where law and equity are admimstered in
separate courts, the equity court will refuse to assume jurisdiction until the plaintiff's legal right has been determined in his
favor in a court of law. 34 Even then it must appear, to
warrant equity jurisdiction and relief, that the determination in
favor of the plaintiff's legal right or title in the court of law
has proved inadequate or ineffective to provide the means of
Baker v Howard County Hunt, supra note 29.
"Baker v Howard County Hunt, supra note 29.
See McClintock, Adequacy of Ineffective Remedy at Law
(1932) 16 MiNN. L. REv. 233 (1932) Moreland, Insolvency of Defendant as Basts of Equity Jurisdiction sn Tort Cases (1933) 22 Ky.
L. J. 1.
Randall v Freed, 154 Cal. 299, 97 Pac. 669 (1908) Mechanics'
Foundry v. Ryall, 75 Cal. 601, 17 Pac. 703 (1888).
"See McRaven v. Culley, 324 Ill. 451, 155 N.E. 282 (1927).
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terminating the defendant's trespass. 3 5 Judgment in the legal
action of ejectment may frequently be effective to terminate
the wrongful trespass where amounting to dispossession of the
plaintiff.
However, gradual modification of the foregoing situation
has come about in this country even where law and equity have
been admnistered in separate courts. For example, on occasion
equity courts have retained the suit in equity, with the issuance
of a temporary injunction, while the matter of the legal title
was determined in a court of law. 36 Or statutes may authorize
the retention of the suit in equity and the sending of the issue
at law to the law court for determination and the certification
of such determination back to the equity court, which then
proceeds from that point, dismissing the suit if the legal title has
been determined favorably to the defendant or proceeding to
consider the need for equitable relief if the determination has
been favorable to the plaintiff. 37 Or it may be provided that the
equity court itself may determine the question of the legal title,
without a jury, upon consent of the parties, or else authorized to
impanel a jury for determination of the question.38
The merger of law and equity powers in one court, in one
form of civil action, under the codes, has resulted in removing
any difficulties by permitting the same court in which the
request for equitable relief is filed to determine the matter of
the legal title and then proceed from there to the equitable
issue.39
In the code states, some question may arise, of course,
ISee Hirschberg v. Flusser, 87 N.J. Eq. 588, 101 Ati. 191 (1917),
where means of enforcement of judgment in plaintiff's favor in
action at law were inadequate to remove encroachment by defendant
on plaintiff's land.
'Erhardt v Boaro, 113 U.S. 537, 5 S. Ct. 565, 28 L. Ed. 1116

(1885).

"See Lake Lenore v. Delaware, L. & W R. Co., 113 N.J. Eq. 533,
168 Atl. 178 (1933).
' "The Chancellor may himself determine the question, if there
be no objection; or he may order the legal title settled by a judgment at law or by a jury upon a feigned issue, at the election of the
defendant." Lake Lenore v. Delaware, L. & W R. Co., supra note 37.
Apparently, even without. statutory authorization, many cases
in the past have held that, if the parties waive the question of a
jury, the equity court could settle the disputed question of title.
WALSH, op. cit. supra note 5 at 165.
Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 40 N.Y. 191 (1869).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

as to whether an action of ejectment may not be proper as
affording adequate relief, rendering it unnecessary if not
actually improper to resort to the equitable powers of the court.
This may be especially true where recovery of the possession of
realty is the real basis rather than the prevention of continued
or repeated trespasses not involving a continued dispossession of
the plaintiff. 40 This may become a matter of prime importance
to the defendant who is entitled to a jury trial in the action of
ejectment but who will be deprived of a jury trial if the action
is phrased as one for equitable relief. 41 However, if trespass is
accomplished by an encroachment in the nature of a building
or the like, it becomes apparent that equitable relief is much
42
more adequate and effective to bring about its removal.

'See WALSH, op cit. supra note 5 at 165.
' In

Campbell v

Rustigian, 60 Cal. A. 2d 500, 140 P

2d 998

(1943) it was stated that the right to trial by jury must be determined from the pleadings; even though the plaintiff is not in possession, if the pleadings do not raise the issue of the right to possession
but merely seek to quiet title to realty, no issue of law is raised
which requires a trial by jury and the proceeding is equitable in
nature. But compare Newman v. Duane, 89 Cal. 597, 27 Pac. 66
(1891)

Syracuse v Hogan, 234 N.Y. 457, 138 N.E. 406 (1923), to

effect that even though equitable relief alone was sought, the recovery of the possession was the main question and thus presented
an action of ejectment requiring a jury trial.
42This is illustrated by Habl v. Sugo, 169 N.Y. 109, 62 N.E. 135
(1901).

